Introduction
In the Harry Potter universe, images in photographs and paintings move about 1 an issue of the wizards' newspaper, the Daily Prophet, shows the Weasley family in a "moving photograph . . . waiving furiously" at the camera while enjoying their vacation at the pyramids in Egypt; 2 the Fat Lady 3 in a painting at the Gryffindor tower entrance speaks to passersby, is sometimes asleep, other times awake, and has gone missing; 4 a photograph of Albus Dumbledore, the headmaster at Hogwarts School of Witchcraft and Wizardry, leaves his trading card. 5 Supposing these items exist, one could posit whether they qualify for copyright protection under current United States law; that is, whether works such as the paintings that hang at † A.B., Georgetown University; B.A., Rutgers University; M.S., University of California, San Diego (Scripps Institution of Oceanography); J.D., Georgetown University Law Center. Email: yjl@georgetown.edu. 3 See, e.g., SORCERER'S STONE at 129. This is how she is referred to in the HARRY POTTER books. No insult towards people who consider themselves to be overweight is implied or intended. 4 See, e.g., AZKABAN at 160. The Fat Lady was missing from her painting and the canvass slashed.
5 SORCERER'S STONE at 103. of subject matter to include future technologies; and (2) the change from protection through the observation of formalities to a system where protection began at the time the work was "fixed into a tangible medium of expression . . ." 25 Under the current Act, 26 a work does not attain copyright protection if it is considered to be in an area of existing subject matter that the Act does not propose to protect, or it is a transient reproduction.
27
The 1976 Act provided for an indefinite expansion of the subject matter coveredfor the first time, Congress contemplated of technologies not in existence at the time of the law's enactment. 28 When choosing to expand the subject matter of copyright, Congress noted that . . . scientific discoveries and technological developments have made possible new forms of creative expression that never existed before. In some of these cases the new expressive forms--electronic music, filmstrips, and computer programs, for example-could be regarded as an extension of copyrightable subject matter Congress had already intended to protect, and were thus considered copyrightable from the outset without the need of new legislation. In other cases, such as photographs, sound recordings, and motion pictures, statutory enactment was deemed necessary to give them full recognition as copyrightable works.
29
Under the 1976 Act, "copyright protection subsists. . . in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a 25 Id.
26 This is in addition to the requirement of originality. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2004) that it did not want to limit protection to current technologies.
Authors are continually finding new ways of expressing themselves, but it is impossible to foresee the forms that these new expressive methods will take. The bill does not intend either to freeze the scope of copyrightable subject matter at the present stage of communications technology or to allow unlimited expansion into areas completely outside the present congressional intent. Section 102 [of the Act] implies neither that that subject matter is unlimited nor that new forms of expression within that general area of subject matter would necessarily be unprotected.
31
Congress also noted that historically, expansion of copyright to forms of expression were gradually expanded as they came "to be recognized as creative and worthy of protection." 32 For example, the United State's first copyright statute in 1790 recognized "only maps, charts, and books;" it was only later statutes that addressed "major forms of expression such as music, drama, and works of art." 33 When enacting the current Act, Congress chose broad language, "to avoid the artificial and largely unjustifiable distinctions derived from cases" 34 statutory copyrightability was no longer dependant "upon the form or medium in which the work is fixed." 35 Yet despite the broad range of protectable subject matter, there were other areas of existing subject matter that the Act did not propose to protect at the time. A second major change in the 1976 Act to the United States copyright regime was the replacement of protection through formalities with protection at the time of fixation. Prior to the 1976 Act, the recognition of copyright protection was dictated by formalities. Determination of copyright depended solely on whether the party holding a copyright had complied with the terms of the Act in effect at the time the work was created, 37 such as registration prior to publication, the publication of the work within a specific time period, submission of copies to the Library of Congress, and proper copyright notice on the work. 38 This also implied a requirement that the work be fixed in a tangible medium of expression as a basic condition of copyright protection.
39
In the 1976 Act, Congress maintained the fixation requirement, but removed most of the formalities.
40
in a physical object in written, printed, photographic, sculptural, punched, magnetic, or any other stable form, and whether it is capable of perception directly or by means of any machine or device now known or later developed.
Id. at 52-53. 36 Id. at 51-52. Suppose an artist has painted a work of art which depicts a man sitting at a desk.
Through some unknown technology [or perhaps through magic], the man in the painting is then
given the ability to speak, move, and think. For the purpose of this hypothetical, he is not alive, merely the animation of a character created by the artist. He is, however, for all intents and purposes, an independently moving and thinking creature who resides in the world depicted in the painting. The magical painting may be considered a window into a reality created and controlled by the artist. The man may stand up and leave the room, speak to other people in the painting, and verbally interact with those viewing the work from the "outside." However, he cannot change his clothes, leave the confines of the painted world, or act in a manner not contemplated by the artist. The question arises as to whether such a man, or the painting itself, would be subject matter covered under the Act. First, it could be argued that the magic painting in our example falls into a combination of three categories of copyrightable subject matter: (1) moving subjects in the photographs and paintings are fixed merely because it does not contemplate a world in which there is magic-how things work is a matter for Patent law, not Copyright law. Magic was not an existing technology, and magically-animated paintings were not existing subject matter in 1976 that Congress chose not to protect. There is nothing in the legislative history to indicate Congress contemplated the physical embodiments of works created or animated through magic. Thus, magically-animated paintings could be construed to be protectable subject matter under the Act.
b. SUBSTANTIATING FIXATION FOR A PAINTING CONTAINING MOVING AND SPEAKING PEOPLE
It must also be asked whether the magically-animated man in our example, because he is able to move and speak, creates an impossible hurdle for the fixation requirement. 54 How he accomplishes these feats may be determinative in proving fixation. If his animation and speech is generated by a fixed program, then he generally satisfies the fixation requirement.
55
However, if he is created through magic or some other "unfixed" technology, a more detailed analysis is required to determine whether he has the necessary "fixation" be given copyright protection under the Act.
One could argue that his transient nature prevents the magically-animated man in our painting from achieving fixation. However, proof of fixation can be based on three arguments:
(1) the painting and the magically-animated man is more than transient or ephemeral; (2) that the painting can be compared to videogames whose software allows for a finite number of results, 54 Id. Electronics, Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 855 (2nd Cir. 1982 ) (holding that the temporary storage of data in the memory of a computer game satisfied "the statutory requirement of a copy in which the work is fixed") (internal quotations omitted).
59 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982 and sounds of the game qualifies for copyright protection as an audiovisual work.
60
Using this comparison, one could argue that the magically-animated painting is the same as a videogame, where the characteristics of the game/painting are fixed, but the player can manipulate the situation. The animation via magic could be equated to the artist acting as the videogame player, setting in motion a series of events based on a complex set of magically preprogrammed sights and sounds.
Third, a character in a painting who moves and talks might be seen as similar to a comic book character rather than a purely literary work, such as a novel. Courts have long held a distinction between literary characters described only through words, and those which are also embodied in drawings, such as comic book characters or cartoons. Purely written descriptions of characters rarely enjoy copyright protection outside of the embodied work. In the seminal case are bound by how the artist contemplated the character. Unlike humans, the magical characters in the paintings will not act outside the bounds that have been set for them by the artist.
For a character to be copyrightable, it should be well-developed and have fixation. If a stand-up comedian creates a well-developed character that appears in thousands of his live shows, but nothing regarding the character is ever written down, the character is not protected by copyright. 67 Likewise, merely describing a character in a book has been viewed as insufficient to grant copyright protections for the character, even though the book itself is copyrightable.
68
However, the man in the painting has more substance than the stand-up comedian's character; he was inked onto the canvas; something was "written down." And he has more substance than a literary character in a book. He is most similar to a character developed in a comic book.
Neither he nor the painting which embodies him can be copied, and he cannot be used in derivative works by those who do not have rights in his copyright.
69
Should we conclude that a spell created a predetermined, finite outcome, then this is no different than using a software program that will produce a finite number of images on the computer screen. If, however, the magic spell is a technical means to create a work, such as a printing press may be used to create an infinite number of pamphlets, the magically-animated painting may be copyrightable but for the fixation requirement. Thus, while we may conclude, that as a whole, the painting with the magically-animated man is not copyrightable, aspects, such as characteristics, may be. 
